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WORKPLACE ROMANCE AND THE ECONOMIC DURESS OF LOVE
CONTRACT POLICIES
IAN J. SILVERBRAND
I. INTRODUCTION
E ARLY in their careers as reporters at the Daily Planet, Metropolis's
leading newspaper, Lois Lane and Clark Kent excelled while working
individually. I Even so, Perry White, the newspaper's editor-in-chief, believ-
ing that Lois and Clark's articles would be even better if they worked as a
team, assigned the two to work together. As a team, Lois and Clark imme-
diately scooped top stories and wrote award-winning articles.
Clark had romantic feelings for Lois even before working with her,
but the mild-mannered reporter felt threatened by Lois's interest in his
alter ego, Superman. Soon, however, those romantic feelings began to
reciprocate as Lois developed interest in Clark-a natural consequence of
Lois spending almost all of her waking hours working with Clark. Eventu-
ally, romance ripened. Romance did not adversely affect their perform-
ance, as romantically involved Lois and Clark continued to be the best
journalists in Metropolis. Eventually, the reporters married. The roman-
tic relationship proved to be a boon to Lois, Clark, and the Daily Planet. It
is therefore fortunate that Perry White did not quash the workplace
romance.
More recent cultural examples reflect more restrictive attitudes about
workplace romance. Boston Legal, a primetime television show on ABC, is a
legal "dramedy" about the fictitious Crane, Poole & Schmidt firm. In one
episode, Paul Lewiston, the firm's managing partner, discovered that Brad
Chase, one of the firm's partners, was having an affair with an associate,
Denise Bauer.2 Lewiston demanded that Brad sign a love contract that
was intended to protect the firm against legal action arising from the work-
place romance. 3 When Brad refused, Lewiston fired him.
Subsequently, one of the founding partners learned of Brad's termi-
nation and offered to rehire him if Brad were to sign the agreement. Brad
successfully petitioned for a hearing before the firm's partnership. At the
hearing he launched an emotionally charged diatribe:
1. This paragraph loosely describes the relationship detailed in the Superman
comic books that my parents read to me as a child. I thank them for introducing
me to the best of Western literature.
2. Boston Legal: Brotherly Love (ABC television broadcast Apr. 10, 2007) (unoffi-
cial transcript available at http://www.boston-legal.org/script/BL03xl9.pdf).
3. For a detailed discussion of "love contracts," see infra notes 76-93 and ac-
companying text.
(155)
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This policy isn't to give you notice; it's to chill relationships, just
nip them in the romantic bud.... Do you farts have any idea
how hard it is for someone who is single, who works 60 hours a
week, to meet someone? The deck is already stacked against us
without you piling on these oppressive contracts! ... I am sick of
being lonely. You can all go to hell, and you don't own me!4
Thereafter, Brad stormed out of the meeting thinking that his plea
had failed. His paramour met him in his office and on impulse he pro-
posed marriage telling her, "You don't have to respond. Ijust want you to
know the offer is on the table. That's a 'love contract' I'll actually sign." 5
Denise accepted the proposal, and the firm ultimately informed Brad that
it decided to terminate the love contract policy. 6 Like Brad and Denise,
other pop culture workplace romances have encountered initial reluc-
tance by employers followed by positive outcomes for employees.7
These pop culture examples illustrate different attitudinal perspec-
tives towards workplace romance. Although some employers value work-
place romances, many frown upon such relationships. These attitudes
permeate employment law and human resource policies. Part II of this
Article describes the diametric approaches to workplace romance. Part III
identifies the relevant legal provisions. Part IV defines one of the most
popularized human resource policies to combat workplace romance-love
contract policies. Part V evaluates the enforceability of love contract poli-
cies in light of the economic duress doctrine. Part VI concludes by sum-
marizing the findings of this Article.
II. APPROACHES TO WORKPLACE ROMANCE
Vicki Schultz identified the dominant historical perspective on work-
place romance. She noted that "[t]he idea that sex has no place in the
workplace is not new. At least since the early 1900s, corporate managers
have seen sexuality as something that properly lies 'outside' the work-
place-something that preexists and threatens it."8 Today, a more ac-
cepting attitude exists.9 These perspectives about the appropriateness of
4. Boston Legal: Brotherly Love, supra note 2 (discussing firm's policy instituting
"love contracts").
5. Id. (distinguishing between marriage and love contract).
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., Ally McBeal: Pyramids on the Nile (FOX television broadcast Feb. 15,
1999). In this episode of AUy McBea4 Cage, Fish & McBeal took on a sexual harass-
ment case. The case involved two coworkers who began to date in spite of their
employer's love contract policy. The coworkers did not disclose their relationship
to their employer because they found the policy so demeaning. The employees
were terminated for violating the company's policy. The employees sued the com-
pany, won at trial, and were awarded $942,000 in damages. See id.
8. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2072 (2003)(presenting historical perspective on workplace romance).
9. SeeVault.com: The Most Trusted Name in Career Information, Vault Office
Romance 2007 Survey: More Employees Caught Canoodling (Feb. 5, 2007), http:/
[Vol. 54: p. 155
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workplace romance shape how employers respond to sexuality in the
workplace.
A. Love Is for Bedrooms, Not Boardrooms
Historically, employers generally believed that the only love employ-
ees should have while at work is love for their job. That is, emotional
feelings of interpersonal love had no place in the office. 10 This attitude
resulted largely from the widespread implementation and acceptance of
principles of scientific management.
Frederick Taylor, one of the intellectual leaders of the Efficiency
Movement of the early twentieth century, developed the theory of scien-
tific management.' The theory, often times termed Taylorism, recom-
mends extreme division of labor to allow the employer to acquire "the
remainder of the skill which the craftsman still retains in his head and
hand not yet transferred to machinery."' 2 Believing that granting employ-
ees control over the work process created inefficiencies, Taylor called for
the development of a class of managers to "assume new burdens, new du-
ties, responsibilities never dreamed of in the past."1 The new class of
managers would bear the "burden of gathering together all of the tradi-
tional knowledge which in the past has been possessed by the workmen
and then of classifying, tabulating, and reducing this knowledge to rules,
laws, and formulae which are immensely helpful to the workmen in doing
their daily work.' 4 The managers would consequently become the em-
ployer's head and the workmen the hands; managers would develop a sci-
ence for each element of a task and select and train workmen to perform
each element. Together, managers and workmen would cooperate to en-
sure that the work is being done properly. 15
Implicit within the managers' control of the employees' work per-
formance is the dehumanization of the workplace.1 6 Sociologists have in-
terpreted the Taylorized, bureaucratic workplace to be overridden with
/www.vault.com/nr/newsmain.sp?nr-page=3&ch-id=420&article-id=28739469
("Generally, employees consider office romances to be acceptable as long as they
do not interfere with work.").
10. See Schultz, supra note 8, at 2063 ("One of American society's most cher-
ished beliefs is that the workplace is-or should be-asexual.").
11. See FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911).
12. John R. Commons, Reviews, 21 AM.J. Soc. 688, 688 (1916) (reviewing ROB-
ERT FRANKLIN HOXIE, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND LABOR (1915)).
13. TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 15.
14. Id. at 15-16.
15. See id.; see also Schultz, supra note 8, at 2073 ("Managers were to be the
'heads' and workers the 'hands' of the organization.").
16. See THOMAS E. HARRIS, APPLIED ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION: PRINCI-
PLES AND PRAGMATICS FOR FUTURE PRACTICE 77 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillmann
eds., Lawrence Erlbaum 2d ed. 2002) ("The efficiency and control generated by
scientific management techniques can dehumanize the workplace creating serious
problems.").
2009]
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concern for "efficiency and consistency in the application of rules," and
have stated that the ideal type of such an organization would be based on
"impersonality, functional specialization, a hierarchy of authority and the
impartial application of rules."1 7
To ensure that these efficiencies manifest and that a perfectly, scien-
tifically managed workplace results, advocates of scientific management
call for "a separation of the public world of [formal] rationality and effi-
ciency from the private sphere of emotional and personal life."1 8 This
point bears directly upon workplace romance. There is nothing more irra-
tional and emotional than love. 19 Sociological and management theories,
therefore, warn that the irrationality with which love is associated could
spill over to the workplace, resulting in inefficiencies in product produc-
tion, which in turn would reduce the prosperity of the employer and em-
ployee. 20 The natural consequence of this logic is that employers should
restrict workplace romance, 21 and that employers should act within their
managerial rights to limit workplace romance and ensure the smooth
functioning of their firm, a necessary component to maximizing
prosperity. 2 2
17. ROSEMARY PRINGLE, SECRETARIES TALK 85-86 (1989).
18. Id.; see also Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 543, 556 (2004) ("Scientific management, as its name implies,
purports to subject workers and employers to the objective laws of science rather
than to the arbitrary whims of human beings."); John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Tay-
lor and the Ironies of Enterprise Liability, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14 (2003) ("In advocat-
ing the importance of managerial control, Taylor also announced a new principle
of managerial responsibility. Firms can be, and indeed, properly ought to be, re-
sponsible for managing wide swaths of American social life.").
19. See BuREAu OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, CORPORATE AFFAIRS: NEPOTISM, OFFICE Ro-
MANCE & SEXUAL HARASSMENT 35 (1988) ("The workplace is not designed to ac-
commodate people falling in love. Love is an irrational emotion; the workplace is
... built on a foundation of rationality."); Schultz, supra note 8, at 2073 ("If work is
the sphere of rationality and order, and if the irrational side of life must be kept at
bay, then it is clear that sexuality must be banished. Few forces are perceived as
more at odds with rationality than sexuality."). The irrationality associated with
love persists even after a relationship's cessation. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 1,
Williams v. Joe Lowther Ins. Agency, Inc., 177 P.3d 1018 (Mont. 2008) (No. 06-
609) [hereinafter Appellant's Reply Brief, Williams] ("When a completely consen-
sual intra-office relationship breaks down, feelings ofjealously and rejection natu-
rally replace the love and caring the parties previously shared."). The manager of
a romantically involved employee must, therefore, be concerned with the full
gamut of emotions that are derivative of a romance should he or she not attempt
to restrict the romance from its beginning.
20. Cf TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 1.
21. Cf Investigation of Taylor Systems of Shop Management: Hearings Before Special
Committee of the House of Representatives to Investigate the Taylor and Other Systems of
Shop Management Under Authority of H.R. 90, 62d Cong. 1416 (1912) (statement of
Frederick Winslow Taylor) (noting that scientific management requires workers to
reconsider "their duties toward their work, toward their fellow man, and toward
their employers").
22. See Schultz, supra note 8, at 2073 (illustratively noting that "Max Weber
recognized, it wasn't just people's hands that were to be controlled; it was also
their hearts."); see also ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORA-
[Vol. 54: p. 155
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The belief that workplace romance would hinder the efficiency of the
employer's business remains to this day. When asked to comment on the
effect that an employer's restriction of workplace romance has upon sex-
ual expression in the workplace, Catharine MacKinnon, the renowned
feminist law professor, retorted that "[s]omebody ought to get worried
about the fact that no work is getting done. And the workplace is not a
place for sexual recruitment exclusively." 23 Others have similarly noted
that " [p] rofessionalization and desexualization of work are notjust worthy
goals for their own sake; they are good for business, for effective work
organizations." 24 Some have made a variant of this argument and sug-
gested that workplace romances can impugn the reputations of employers
and romantic coworkers alike, thereby forcing employers to inefficiently
expend resources to protect their reputation in the marketplace. 25
Related to efficiency, employers worry that workplace romance may
lead to unwarranted favoritism by and between romantic coworkers,
thereby facilitating potentially unwarranted promotions and salary raises.
Surveys have shown that a small, but significant, percentage of the working
force engages in workplace romance for career advancement. 26 Herbert
TION 22 (1993) (describing Max Weber's conception of organization as
"passionless").
23. Abigail Cope Saguy, Sexual Harassment in France and the United States: Activ-
ists and Public Figures Defend Their Definitions, in RETHINKING COMPARATIVE CULTURAL
SOCIOLOGY 56, 66 (Michhle Lamont & Laurent Thfvenot eds., 2000) (quoting
Catharine MacKinnon).
24. BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BE-
HAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN AND ORGANIZATIONS 128 (1985).
25. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441, 487
n.172 (2007) ("The board of directors of Boeing forced Boeing's president and
chief executive, Harry Stonecipher, to resign after the board learned about Mr.
Stonecipher's extra-marital affair with a female executive. The board determined
that Mr. Stonecipher used poor judgement and placed Boeing in a potentially
damaging situation."); Marshall Loeb, Five Tips to Consider When You Fall in Love on
the Job, CAREERJOURNAL.COM, Sept. 22, 2005, http://www.careerjournaleurope.
com/myc/officelife/20050922-loeb.html ("Romancing your boss most often looks
like you're trying to get ahead at work, and dating your subordinate reeks of des-
perate play for power."). But see Carol Hymowitz &Joann S. Lublin, Many Compa-
nies Look the Other Way at Employee Affairs, WALL ST.J., Mar. 8, 2005, at BI (" 'Usually
when a top executive has to resign over having had [consensual] sex with an em-
ployee, that's just an excuse to get rid of that executive,' says Kathleen Peratis, a
partner at law firm Outten & Golden.").
26. See Rosemary Haefner, Office Romances Rarely Kept Secret, CNN.coM, Feb.
13, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/worklife/02/13/office.romance/
index.html ("Although 98 percent of those who dated a higher-ranking co-worker
say the relationship has no affect on their career advance, many people will assume
a promotion-not mutual attraction-is your motivation."); Nick Mathiason, Sal-
aiy, Hours, Benefits, Holiday Entitlement. .. and a Love Contract, OBSERVER (U.K.),
Dec. 23, 2007, at 3 ("There is evidence that a significant number of directors have
benefited from an office affair. A survey out this weekend from TakeLegalAd-
vice.com reveals that 4 percent of directors of companies with more than 1,000
employees say either that their career benefited from an affair, or that they pro-
moted a lover.").
2009]
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Marcuse, a prominent philosopher often associated with the sexual libera-
tion movement, theoretically recognized that workplace sexuality contrib-
utes to career advancement. He wrote:
The sexy office and sales girl, the handsome, virile junior execu-
tive and floor walker are highly marketable commodities, and the
possession of suitable mistresses-once the prerogative of kings,
princes, and lords-facilitates the career of even the less exalted
ranks in the business community.2 7
Nevertheless, the career advancement of some as a result of work-
place romance is problematic to others. Workplace romance decreases
motivation for uninvolved coworkers, thereby likely causing a net loss in
productivity for the employer.28 Uninvolved coworkers may perceive the
workplace romance as giving the paramours an unfair competitive advan-
tage. This realization may result in decreased job motivation and de-
creased job performance. Mary Kate Sheridan has noted that workplace
romance can, therefore, result in "employees [being] assessed according
to their sexual conduct, rather than their work product. Favoritism may
convey to employees that their sexuality, rather than their hard work or
creativity, is the currency needed to gain benefits in the workplace." 29
B. Cupid Can Strike at Any Time, So Embrace His Work
An emerging perspective is that employers should not meddle in
workplace romance because workplace romance is inevitable. 30 The tradi-
tional work schedule was eight hours a day, five days a week, but the preva-
lence of the traditional work schedule is declining. Employees now more
frequently work on nontraditional schedules, 3 1 which often involve longer
27. HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSINA MAN 76 (1964) (asserting that inter-
office relationships facilitate participants' careers).
28. See generally Gary N. Powell & Sharon Foley, Something to Talk About: Roman-
tic Relationships in Organizational Settings, 24J. MGMT. 421, 445 (1998) ("Two kinds
of romances have the most damaging effect on group morale and organizational
effectiveness, (a) hierarchical romances in which one participant directly reports
to the other and (b) utilitarian romances in which one participant satisfies per-
sonal/sexual needs in exchange for satisfying the other participant's task-related
and/or career-related needs.").
29. Mary Kate Sheridan,Just Because It's Sex Doesn't Mean It's Because of Sex: The
Needfor New Legislation to Target Sexual Favoritism, 40 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 379,
383 (2007) (recognizing negative perceptions of romantically involved
employees).
30. Cf Sharon Jayson, Workplace Romance No Longer Gets the Kiss-Off USA To-
DAY, Feb. 8, 2006, at 9D (noting that survey by Opinion Research Corporation for
America Online found that more than half of single men and two-fifths of all sin-
gle women would be open to dating their co-worker).
31. See Terrence M. McMenamin, A Time to Work: Recent Trends in Shift Work
and Flexible Schedules, MONTHLY LAB. REv. Dec. 2007, at 3 ("[N]early one-third of
wage and salary workers have flexible schedules on their primary jobs, meaning
that they can vary their beginning and ending hours; about one-fifth work a shift
[Vol. 54: p. 155
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hours. 32 As workers spend more time in the office, it becomes more likely
that Cupid's arrow will strike at the office. 33 A recent survey reported in
the New York Times found that fifty-eight percent of employees have en-
gaged in workplace romance, fourteen percent of which dated a superior
and nineteen percent of which dated a subordinate.3 4 A different survey
found that forty-four percent of managers who dated a coworker said their
relationship led to marriage. 35 Another survey determined that over fifty
percent of workplace romances lead to some sort of long-term commit-
ment.36 Some surveys have subsequently found that "anywhere from one-
third to one-half of all romances now start at work."' 37 Studies have also
determined that workplace paramours have a high relapse rate. "Twenty
percent of the 6,700 surveyed workers have engaged in an office romance
more than twice."' 38 This trend has caused one worker to claim that "the
workplace serves as a replacement for the bar scene."39
other than a regular daytime shift on their primary job; and a slightly smaller pro-
portion works on Saturday, Sunday or both.").
32. See Peter Kuhn & Fernando Lozano, The Expanding Workweek? Understand-
ing Trends in Long Work Hours Among US. Men, 1979-2004 3 (IZA, Discussion Paper
No. 1924, 2006) ("After declining for most of the century, the share of employed
American men regularly working more than 50 hours per week began to increase
around 1970. This trend has been especially pronounced among highly educated,
high-wage, salaried, and older men."); see also Stephanie Armour, U.S. Workers Feel
Burn of Long Hours, Less Leisure, USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 2003, at lB ("Combined
weekly work hours for dual-earning couples with children rose 10 hours per week,
from 81 hours in 1977 to 91 hours in 2002.").
33. See MICHAEL KORDA, MALE CHAUVINISM! How IT WORKS 108 (1972)
("[T]he amount of sexual energy circulating in any office is awe-inspiring, and
given the slightest sanction and opportunity it bursts out."); cf. Vault.com: The
Most Trusted Name in Career Information, The Thrilling Scoop on Workplace
Romance, http://www.vault.com/nr/printable.jsp?ch-id=402&articleid=19496&
print=l (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Thrilling Scoop] ("Cupid arrives,
whether you're working in a glass-enclosed tower in Los Angeles or New York City,
a farm in Kansas, or a computer assembly line in Taiwan.").
34. See Mireya Navarro, Love the Job? What About Your Boss?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2005, at H1-9; see also Jayson, supra note 30, at 9D ("Forty percent of employees
reported being involved in such a romance at some point in their careers.").
35. Am. Mgmt. Assoc., Workplace Dating: 44% of Office Romances Led to
Marriage, AMA Survey Shows (Feb. 10, 2003), http://www.amanet.org/press/
amanews/workplace-dating.htm (surveying managers engaged in workplace
romance).
36. See Thrilling Scoop, supra note 33 (recognizing majority of workplace
romances result in long-term commitments).
37. Timothy S. Bland, Romance in the Workplace: Good Thing or Bad, WAsH.
Bus. J., Oct. 20, 2000 ("According to some surveys, anywhere from one-third to
one-half of all romances now start at work.").
38. Haefner, supra note 26.
39. WiredBerries, Workplace "Love Contracts" 101 (uly 5, 2007), http://
wiredberries.com/flash/2007/07/workplace-love-contracts_101.asp (internal
quotations omitted).
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Public perception of workplace romance has improved because em-
ployees significantly benefit from the relationships that they develop. 40
Romantic coworkers in marriages or other long-term relationships are
happier with themselves and their work situations. There is strong theo-
retical support for this belief. Alluding to Sigmund Freud's pleasure prin-
ciple, 41 Marcuse has noted that workplace sexuality should be encouraged
as a means of gratification on otherwise boring jobs.42 The emotional ex-
citement associated with workplace romance would theoretically result in
higher levels of personal and job satisfaction.
In theory, these higher levels of satisfaction could also benefit the em-
ployer. Marcuse suggested that workplace sexuality may "be useful in
terms of morale, as a kind of libidinal 'indulgency pattern."4 He ex-
plained that employers should permit workplace romance because when
sexuality is integrated into the workplace, it becomes subject to "(con-
trolled) satisfaction ... [b]ut no matter how controlled ... it is also gratify-
ing to the managed individuals. . . . Pleasure, thus adjusted, generates
submission." 4 4 Some social scientists have found evidence to support the
perspective that marital status, and implicitly romantic status, is positively
related to job satisfaction levels.45
40. See generally LINDA WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:
WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY
(2000) (discussing benefits of relationships).
41. See generally SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE (James
Strachey trans., Liveright Publ'g Corp. 1961) (1920).
42. See MARCUSE, supra note 27, at 12 (describing workplace romance as em-
ployee incentive).
43. See Peter Fleming, Sexuality, Power and Resistance in the Workplace, 28 ORG.
STUD. 239, 243 (2007) (interpreting Marcuse in light of ALVIN GOULDNER, WILDCAT
STRIKE: A STUDY OF AN UNOFFICIAL STRIKE (1955)).
44. See GOULDNER, supra note 43, at 70-71.
45. See, e.g., Cathy F. Bowen, Rama Radhakrishna & Robin Keysor, Job Satisfac-
tion and Commitment of 4-H Agents, J. EXTENSION, June 1994, available at http://
www.joe.org/joe/1994june/rb2.html ('Job satisfaction of agents was significantly
related to... marital status."); C. Carnall & Ray Wild, Job Attitudes and Overall Job
Satisfaction: The Effect of Biographical and Employment Variables: Research Note, 1I J.
MGMT. STUD. 62, 66 (1974) ("Marital status appears to have a relatively substantial
effect on the relationship of self-actualization and job satisfaction and on the rela-
tionship of overall satisfaction and attitudes to supervision, personnel/industrial
relations, training, social peer relations and the amount of work and effort re-
quired."); Charles N. Weaver, Sex Differences in the Determinants ofJob Satisfaction, 21
AcAD. MGMT.J. 265, 267 (1978) (implying that serious workplace romance benefits
romantic coworkers); see also id. (stating that "employed married women should be
more job satisfied when their husbands are employed"); Andrea Kay, Would You
Sign a 'Love Contract'?, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Apr. 23, 2007 (on file with author)
("[C]o-workers who spend more time at work, have higher motivation, fewer sick
days and less turnover.").
[Vol. 54: p. 155
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III. Is CUPID AIMING His ARROW AT THE EMPLOYER'S WALLET?
The law contributes to the reason why most employers accept the re-
strictive perspective. The law makes employers legally and financially lia-
ble should workplace romance go awry. 46
Workplace romance implicates the law of sexual discrimination. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating
in hiring, and from limiting, segregating, classifying, or discharging em-
ployees on the basis of sex. 47 Title VII, however, provides little guidance
as to what discrimination based on sex means. In fact, Title VII's refer-
ence to sex was a late addition to the drafted legislation. While being
debated on the House floor, Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia
offered an amendment to include "sex" to Title VII. 4 8 Many have sug-
gested that the "sex" term was added in order to undermine the bill's via-
bility.4 9 Perhaps as a result of this history, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) "viewed the sex amendment as a fluke,
conceived out of wedlock, and tried to ignore its existence .... ,,50 The
EEOC's initial slow foot is to some extent understandable-no committee
hearing or report within the Congressional Record exists to explain why
the amendment was adopted or what it was intended to do.5 1
In light of that obscurity, academics began to theorize about how Ti-
tle VII should function. MacKinnon not only paved the road for recogniz-
ing a claim for sexual harassment by deftly negotiating the legal, social,
and political issues involved in such a claim in her revolutionary scholar-
ship,52 but she also served as co-counsel to the respondent in the first Su-
preme Court case to recognize sexual harassment as sexual discrimination
46. See Schultz, supra note 8, at 2064-65 ("Libertarian critics claim that the
threat of employer liability under Title VII, combined with a vague definition of
harassment, gives employers an incentive to go overboard in regulating employee
conduct.").
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2006).
48. SeeJo Freeman, How 'Sex' Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker
of Public Policy, 9 L. & INEQUALITY 163, 163 (1991).
49. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD, CONGRESSIONAL POWER: CONGRESS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 299 (1975) ("Bitter opponents of the job discrimination tite ... decided
to try to load up the bill with objectionable features that might split the coalition
supporting it."); CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIvIL RIGHTS ACT 234 (1985) (" [I] t was the result
of a deliberate ploy by foes of the bill to scuttle it."); cf. Michael Evan Gold, A Tale
of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for
the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DuQ. L. REV. 453, 458 (1980) (noting how Repre-
sentative Smith "occasioned great hilarity" from House floor because he read let-
ters he received relating to underlying need for amendment).
50. Freeman, supra note 48, at 163-64 (intemal quotations omitted).
51. See Gold, supra note 49, at 458 (rationalizing EEOC's resistance to prose-
cute sex discrimination).
52. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WO-
MEN: A CASE OF SEX DIScIMINATION (1979); Catharine A. MacKinnon, 10 CAP. U.
L. Ro'. ix (1981) ("As the first legal wrong to be defined by women, sexual harass-
ment has been called a feminist invention.").
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under Title VII.5 3 In one book, MacKinnon categorized "quid pro quo"
and "condition of work" sexual harassment and noted that, regardless of
the form of sexual harassment, the conduct should come within the pur-
view of Title VII because "[w] omen are sexually harassed by men because
they are women, that is, because of the social meaning of female sexuality
"54
When SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX Dis-
CRIMINATION was first published, most courts believed that sexual harass-
ment was not based upon sex, but instead based upon behavior and
therefore outside the scope of Title VII. For example, in Barnes v. Train,
55
an employee refused to have a sexual relationship with her supervisor and
brought forth a sexual discrimination claim after being reassigned. 56 The
district court judge did not believe the reassignment was based on sex, but
instead based on behavior and therefore not within the scope of Title VII.
He noted:
The substance of plaintiffs complaint is that she was discrimi-
nated against, not because she was a woman, but because she re-
fused to engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor. This is a
controversy underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious
personal relationship. Regardless of how inexcusable the con-
duct of plaintiffs supervisor might have been, it does not evi-
dence an arbitrary barrier to continued employment based on
plaintiffs sex.
5 7
Ultimately, this decision was reversed on appeal in Barnes v. Costle,58 as
were other district court decisions with analogous reasoning. 59
Such reversals reflect the slow change in judicial attitudes towards sex-
ual harassment that eventually culminated in the Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson6 ° decision. There, the Supreme Court held that "a plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on
sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment."6 1 The Court
noted that to be actionable, sexual harassment "must be sufficiently severe
53. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (establishing
claim of hostile work environment under Title VII).
54. MACKINNON, supra note 52, at 174.
55. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974).
56. See id. at 124.
57. Id.
58. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
59. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F.
Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
60. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
61. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 66.
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or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and cre-
ate an abusive working environment." 62
Though many feminists endorsed the result of this decision, some
were unfavorable in their assessment of the case. In particular, Schultz has
been critical of the expansion of Title VII to include sexual harassment.
She has noted that there is no statutory basis to believe that Title VII re-
ferred to sexuality or sex harassment.63 Instead, she claims, Title VII was
intended to end job discrimination. 64 Schultz noted that:
[e]arly on, as we have seen, the promise of sex harassment law to
help dismantle sex segregation and inequality was lost and re-
placed with an emphasis on eradicating workplace sexuality. In
the process, sexual harassment law has bestowed new life and in-
creased legitimacy on an age-old managerial dream of achieving
a perfectly rational workplace devoid of sexuality and other dis-
tracting passions. 65
Despite such concerns, the Supreme Court validated sexual harass-
ment law and continued to develop this evolving doctrine. For example,
in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth66 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,67
the Supreme Court held that employers are potentially liable for harass-
ment by supervisory employees even if the victim did not experience "tan-
gible retaliation."68 Ellerth and Faragher, however, do provide employers
with an affirmative defense to vicarious liability where there is no tangible
retaliation, if the employer demonstrates that he "exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior" and
that the employee "unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preven-
tive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise."69
Because courts subject employers to legal liability for the unautho-
rized actions of their employees but shield them from liability if they at-
tempt to prevent sexually harassing behavior, many employers feel
compelled to vigilantly monitor workplace romance. If they do not, em-
ployers can be subjected to costly legal liability on numerous grounds. 70
62. Id. at 67 (internal quotation omitted).
63. Schultz, supra note 8, at 2075.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 2191.
66. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
67. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
68. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) ("An em-
ployer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile work environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee."); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 807 (1998) (holding same).
69. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778.
70. SeeJessica Lynn Mok O'Neill, If You Love Me Dear, Please Sign Here: Will the
'Love Contract' Play a Role in Protecting Employers from Sexual Harassment Liability ?, 40
2009]
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For example, when a workplace romance ends, romantic coworkers may
claim that the relationship was not consensual and that they experienced
sexual harassment or retaliation by the other coworker attempting to re-
vive the relationship.
Some courts have recently expanded the scope of sexual harassment
law to include employees who are not the actual object of harassment.7 1
An example of this expansion is Miller v. Department of Corrections,72 in
which plaintiff employees claimed sexual harassment based upon the con-
duct of the warden at the state prison where the plaintiffs were employed.
The plaintiffs alleged that the warden engaged in sexual affairs with three
subordinate employees and subsequently gave those employees unwar-
ranted favorable treatment. 73 Though those subordinates might have
been able to argue that the favorable treatment was warranted and pre-
dictable in light of Marcuse's theoretical perspective, the subordinates es-
sentially admitted that the treatment was unwarranted. One subordinate
even said that she received a promotion because she could "'take him [the
warden] down' with her knowledge of 'every scar on his body.' 74 The
Supreme Court of California concluded that the plaintiffs had established
a cause of action for hostile work environment stemming from sexual har-
assment because a "hostile environment may be created even if the plain-
tiff never is subjected to sexual advances" and because a hostile
environment can be proven by "demonstrating that widespread sexual fa-
voritism was severe or pervasive enough to alter his or her working condi-
tions."75 Clearly, employers need not only concern themselves with the
effects of workplace romance upon the paramours, but also upon other
coworkers.
IV. LovE CONTRACT POLICIES DEFINED
In economic terms, opponents of workplace romance believe that ro-
mantic coworkers create considerable externalities in the form of poten-
tial employer legal liability and coworker demotivation. Where the
externalities created by workplace romance outweigh the combination of
the benefits of the relationships and the costs of restricting them, it is
economically rational for an employer to attempt to force employees to
internalize the externalities by sanitizing the workplace through the re-
striction of workplace sexuality. Developed in 1982 by attorneys at Littler
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 311, 320 (2006) ("The cost of attorney's fees for sexual harass-
ment cases can reach upwards of $80,000 before a case even makes it to the court-
room."); see also HR.BLR.com, 'Love Contracts' Lessen Liability from Consensual
Workplace Dating (Feb. 6, 2006), http://hr.br.com/whitepapers.aspx?id=17668.
71. See generally Cheryl L. Howard, Romeo and Juliets: A Modern Workplace Trag-
edy, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 805 (2007).
72. 115 P.3d 77 (Cal. 2005).
73. See id. at 80.
74. Id. at 82.
75. Id. at 87, 90.
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Mendelson of San Francisco, 76 the love contract policy is a device that
employers can utilize in order to restrict workplace romance and limit
their potential liability.
77
Love contract policies merge elements of non-fraternization policies
and consensual relationship agreements. Non-fraternization policies pro-
hibit social relationships between employees, most usually between super-
visors and subordinates. 78 Consensual relationship agreements are
written attestations signed by romantically involved coworkers that ac-
knowledge their relationship to be consensual and agree that a breakup
will have no adverse impact on job performance. 79 Drawing upon both of
these devices, a love contract policy dictates that an employee who is ro-
mantically involved with a coworker must inform the employer of the rela-
tionship and sign a love contract. If the employees fail to fulfill these
duties, the employer can then terminate the employees. In order to give
employees notice of the love contract policy, employers integrate it into
corporate employee handbooks and widely disseminate it throughout the
office.8 0
Underlying the love contract policy is an actual legal document-the
love contract. Love contracts primarily protect the employer from a sex-
ual harassment suit by evidencing that the outset of a romantic workplace
relationship was consensual.8 1 Echoing this sentiment, Robin Bond has
noted that love contracts are "'all about CYA,' . . . using the acronym for
'Cover your ass." 82
76. Eric Cravey, Untangling Office Love Knots, JACKSONVILLE Bus. J., Sept. 3,
1999 (on file with author).
77. The form and substance of love contracts have changed with time. Jeff
Tannenbaum, one of the contract's creators, explained that originally, the love
contract was a written warning. He has explained that the earlier form of the love
contract was "in the form of a counseling notice or company memo to remind or
warn the employee about the company's sexual harassment policy." Id.
78. See Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (upholding employee termination for violation of nonfraternization
policy by engaging in sexual relationship with coworker); see also Deffenbaugh-
Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 585 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing
that employer's nonfraternization policy did not prohibit "employees from dating
if they were not in a direct supervisory relationship.").
79. See Mark Hansen, Love's Labor Laws, 84 A.B.A. J. 78, 79 (1998).
80. See HR.BLR.com, supra note 70.
81. Kay, supra note 45; see also Sarah Elizabeth Richards, "Before We Hook Up,
Can You Sign This?", SALON.COM,July 21, 2005, http://archive.salon.com/mwt/fea-
ture/2005/07/21/love-contracts/print.html (noting that implementing love con-
tract policy is "building your defense"); HR.BLR.com, supra note 70 ("'[L]ove
contracts' should be used to supplement a company's antiharassment policy, not
in place of a well-implemented policy against sexual harassment.").
82. See Richards, supra note 81 (quoting Robin Bond, Esq.).
2009]
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Guttierez, Preciado & House LLP of Pasadena has distributed its sam-
ple love contract.8 3 It states that by signing the love contract, the employ-
ees "notify the company that [they] wish to enter into a voluntary and
mutual consensual social relationship" which they "are both free to end
... at any time. Should the relationship end, [they] agree that [they] will
not allow the breakup to negatively impact the performance of [their] du-
ties."84 The contract can also include recognition of the employer's sex-
ual harassment policy and that "entering into the social relationship has
not been made a condition or term of employment." 85 This language is
representative. Attorneys have noted that the terms of the love contract
should vary based upon the circumstances of the relationship. 86 A drafter
can also add language that would explicate that the employees are re-
quired to follow reporting procedures if they begin to feel uncomfortable
in their romantic relationship.
8 7
Scholars, attorneys, and human resource professionals have panned
love contracts as overkill, 8 8 impractical, 89 and misnomers. 90 These same
critics have also criticized love contracts for stifling workplace romances
regardless of their duration. 91 Sarah Richards described this concern in
narrative:
83. See Guttierez, Preciado & House LLP: California Employment Lawyers,
Office Romance Policy and Contract, http://www.gutierrez-preciado.com/
HotjTopics/OfficeRomance.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2008) (on file with author).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See HR.BLR.com, supra note 70 (contemplating terms that may vary as
result of power differentials between romantic coworkers).
87. See Richards, supra note 80 (noting how love contracts should function).
88. See Christine Lagorio, Love, Contractually, CBS NEws, May 17, 2005, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/17/eveningnews/main696022.shtml ("If
you're looking for a love poem, don't come to an attorney. But even some attor-
neys see the 'love contract' as overkill.").
89. See HR.com, Doing the Love Contract (June 2, 2003), http://www.hr.
com/hr/communities/legal/workplaceregulations/doing.the-love-contract_
eng.html ("Many lawyers and professional HR people are coming to the opinion
that company policies that just prohibit any kind of romantic attachment between
employees aren't practical to enforce and often cause disruption and inefficiency
in the workforce.").
90. I must mention that there are some generalized concerns that the "love
contract" is a misnomer and that there may not be a legally enforceable contract. I
believe, however, that the love contract is a binding contract. Very briefly, the
romantically involved coworkers are promising to one another that if the relation-
ship sours, they will not let it affect their working relationship. A breach of that
promise would result in the employer having a right to terminate employment.
Because there are a set of promises, the breach of which creates a remedy, the love
contract conforms to the definition of "contract" provided in Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 1.
91. See Lagorio, supra note 88 ("But some say a love contract is something only
a lawyer could come up with. 'I think it makes a relationship kind of cold... I'd
almost want to have it more romantic and secret."); Richards, supra note 80
(describing romantically involved coworkers who felt "uncomfortable" about sign-
ing love contracts, but eventually did sign and thereafter married, and introducing
[Vol. 54: p. 155
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Love contracts may enable legally safe sex in the workplace, but
they're about as romantic as nooky in the office supply room. In
the typical progression of a relationship-from establishing ex-
clusivity to meeting family to saying 'I love you'-where exactly
does 'We must sign this legal document so we can protect our
company in case I freak out and make your life a living hell' fit
in?92
Despite these critiques, employers continue to implement love contract
policies or similar variations thereof with great frequency. 93
V. LovE CONTRACT POLICIES AS A FoRM OF ECONOMIC DuREss
Love contract policies are well-known by employment lawyers in the
United States, 94 yet there is scant case law discussing love contract policies.
I am aware of only one American case that related to the legality of love
contracts. Williams v. Joe Lowther Insurance Agency, Inc. details the conflict
relating to an owner of a company who hired his long-term, married mis-
tress to work for his company. 95 The romantic relationship waned and the
owner informed his employee that he "needed her more personally than
professionally." 96 He consequently offered her a severance package and
told her that she had the choice of either resuming an intimate relation-
ship or leaving the job. She refused and soon thereafter was terminated. 9 7
The employee claimed that the owner unlawfully subjected her to quid
pro quo sex discrimination, and a commission ruled in her favor and or-
dered the owner to pay damages.9 8 The owner appealed, claiming that he
did not terminate her because of her sex.9 9
The Supreme Court of Montana rejected the owner's arguments, not-
ing that the district court had rejected the owner's claim that the Hearing
Examiner prejudiced his rights by virtue of irregularities in the proceed-
reader to "Art, 36, who works at a financial services firm in Manhattan" and who
was concerned that love contract policies "could threaten perfectly good but mean-
ingless office flings by forcing a relationship status.").
92. Id.
93. Cf Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Love at Work, 13 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y
237, 248 (2006) ("A 1999 survey reported that ninety-seven percent of the 496
companies that responded to a faxed survey indicated that they had written sexual
harassment policies .... ."); Kathy Gurchiek, Most Organizations Lack Policy on Office
Romance, SOC. FOR HUM. RES. MGMT., Feb. 9, 2006, http://www.shrm.org/
hrnews-published/archives/CMS_015775.asp ("[M]ore organizations are requir-
ing employees to inform their supervisors of workplace-related romances, with 39
percent of HR professionals noting this."). Gurchiek estimated that a few thou-
sand love contracts are written annually. See id.
94. Cf id.
95. 177 P.3d 1018 (Mont. 2008).
96. Id. at 1020.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 1021.
99. See id. at 1023.
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ings. 10 0 For example, the owner attempted to offer expert testimony ex-
plaining why the termination was commercially reasonable in light of a
love contract that had been entered into by and between the owner and
the employee.' 0' The love contract supposedly contained a clause that if
the romantic relationship were to end, then the employee would leave the
company. 10 2 The court noted that the district court properly refused to
hear the expert testimony because it was irrelevant and the existence of a
love contract was a question of fact that an expert could not resolve.' 0 3
This conclusion conformed to the Montana Department of Labor
and Industry's Final Agency Decision to reject the owner's attempt to use a
love contract as an affirmative defense.' 0 4 There, the Hearing Examiner
explained that even if a love contract existed, the contract would be unen-
forceable as contrary to public policy. The Hearing Examiner explained
that the clause that would have required the employee to leave the com-
pany if the relationship ended was essentially an agreement to condition
employment on the continuation of an affair, which would essentially con-
stitute a waiver of the employee's right to be free from adverse employ-
ment action due to sex-a violation of the state's human fights law.10 5
The Hearing Examiner also explained that such a clause would cause the
contract to be an agreement "in derogation of... marriage, a legal rela-
tionship defined and protected by Montana law, and, as such, would be
void . . . given [the employee's] marital status." 10 6
The Hearing Examiner also concluded that the love contract was "a
contract of adhesion, given the disparate bargaining powers of supervisor
and subordinate."10 7 The Hearing Examiner's succinct ruling and analy-
sis implies a concern about the underlying fairness of the agreement.
Though the Hearing Examiner did not specify that this unfairness was a
result of economic duress, many have noted that economic duress is
100. See id. at 1022.
101. See id.
102. See id.; see also Brief of Appellant at 5, Williams v. Joe Lowther Ins.
Agency, Inc., 177 P.3d 1018 (Mont. 2008) (No. 06-609) [hereinafter Brief of Ap-
pellant, Williams] ("Lisa assured him that if the relationship led to problems, she
would voluntarily and gracefully leave her employment with Lowther Insurance.");
Appellant's Reply Brief, Williams, supra note 19.
103. Williams, 117 P.3d at 1022.
104. Williams v.Joe Lowther Ins. Agency, Inc., HRC Case No. 0041010741, at
*17 (Mont. Dep't of Lab. & Indus. Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://erd.dli.mt.
gov/humanright/decisions/finalorders/2005pdf/williamsfad.pdf [hereinafter
Hearing Examiner, Williams] (testimony concerning love contract "was not
credible").
105. See id. ("Factually, such an agreement between supervisor and
subordinate would expressly condition her continued employment on continua-
tion of the affair. This, on its face, would constitute a waiver of Williams' right,
under the Human Rights Act, to be free from adverse employment action because
of sex.").
106. Id.
107. Id.
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closely related to contracts of adhesion,' 0 8 as both theories relate to con-
tract creation in spite of unconscionability. 109
Indeed, the considerations that led the Williams Hearing Examiner to
conclude that the love contract was a contract of adhesion would also
counsel towards the determination that the love contract was signed under
economic duress. 11 0 The doctrine of economic duress is fundamental in
contract law."' Where a party to a contract manifested assent as a result
of an improper economic threat, the contract may be voidable by the vic-
timized party. 112 Economic duress, which is also described as "business
compulsion,""13 can arise in two circumstances: (1) where a party to the
contract induces the duressed assent, or (2) where a non-party to the con-
tract induces the duressed assent.'1 4 Love contract policies implicate only
the latter circumstance because the employer does not actually sign the
love contract. Love contract policies should be legally unenforceable be-
cause they violate the economic duress doctrine.
A. Economic Duress Defined
Where a non-party induces a contractual party's manifestation of as-
sent, the victim usually may void the contract. 15 Although the Restatement
108. See, e.g., R. Epstein, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Its Cause and Cure, in
THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 245, 255 (S. Rottenberg ed., 1978);J.M.
Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
1990 DuKE LJ. 375, 415-16 (1990) (discussing contracts of adhesion and eco-
nomic duress in unison); TheodoreJ. St. Antoine, Employment-At-Will-Is the Model
Act the Answer?, 23 STETSON L. REv. 179, 196 (1993) (same); see also Sian E. Provost,
A Defense of a Rights-Based Approach to Identifying Coercion in Contract Law, 73 TEX. L.
REv. 629, 632 (1995) ("When the weaker party's bargaining position is due to his
financial condition, courts sometimes invalidate contracts because of so-called 'ec-
onomic coercion,' or 'economic duress.' . .. Also, the suspicion with which courts
view contracts of adhesion is based on the same premise-that one party's accept-
ance is not free in spite of the absence of a threat to violate that party's rights.").
109. See generally E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 4.28, at 332-33 (1990)
("Procedural unconscionability is broadly conceived to encompass not only the
employment of sharp practices and the use of fine print and convoluted language,
but a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power."); see also Rich-
ard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doc-
trines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 19 (1993) ("[D]uress is a 'worse' form of procedural
unconscionability than taking advantage of necessity or failing to explain a fine-
print contract."); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1923 (1992) (noting adhesion contracts are considered proce-
durally unconscionable).
110. For example, both analyses would include consideration of the disparate
power distribution.
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979).
112. See id. § 175(1) ("If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by im-
proper threat by the other party that leaves the victim with no reasonable alterna-
tive, the contract is voidable by the victim.").
113. See id. at ch. 7, topic 2, introductory note (1979).
114. See id. § 175.
115. Id. § 175(2) ("If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by one who
is not a party to the transaction, the contract is voidable by the victim . . ").
20091
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(Second) of Contracts does not explicate under which circumstances a non-
party induces assent of a contractual party,' 1 6 it is clear that the Restatement
is contemplating exposure and susceptibility to economic duress.' 1 7
Economic duress takes its form through the levy of an improper
threat, expressed by words or conduct,' 18 which leaves the victim with no
reasonable alternative. 119 The Restatement identifies numerous examples
of threats that are improper. One example of an improper threat is a
threat that is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a
contract with the recipient.' 20 In such a scenario, because the threat is so
shocking, courts will not inquire into the fairness of the resulting ex-
change and the resulting contract is outright voidable. 121 Another exam-
ple is a threat in which the threatened action is a crime or tort.12 2
Nevertheless, sometimes the threat may not be shocking, but the com-
bination of the threat and its resulting unfairness will render the threat
improper.' 2 3 If the resulting exchange is on unfair terms, then a threat
may be improper either where the threatened act would harm the recipi-
ent but not significantly benefit the party making the threat, or where the
threatened act is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends. 124 The
commentary explains with respect to the "not significantly benefit" scena-
rio that "[i]f, on the [victim's] refusal to contract, the maker of the threat
were to do the threatened act, it would therefore be done maliciously and
unconscionably, out of pure vindictiveness." 12 5 It cites the example of a
threat to make public embarrassing information regarding the victim un-
less he or she assents to a contract. 126 The commentary provides an addi-
tional example of a threat that does not significantly benefit the party
making the threat:
A makes a threat to B, his former employee, that he will try to
prevent B's employment elsewhere unless B agrees to release a
claim that he has against A. B, having no reasonable alternative,
116. See id.
117. This is gleaned from the title of this Section of the Restatement. "When
Duress By Threat Makes A Contract Voidable." The Comments also provide addi-
tional evidence. Comment A notes that "[tihe essence of the type of duress dealt
with in this Section is inducement." Id. § 175 cmt. a.
118. See id. ("[An improper threat] may be inferred from words or other
conduct.").
119. See id. § 175(a) cmt. a ("The essence of [economic] duress ... is induce-
ment by an improper threat."); see id. § 175(a) cmt. b ("A threat, even if improper,
does not amount to duress if the victim has a reasonable alternative to succumbing
and takes advantage of it.").
120. See id. § 176 (1)(d) (1979).
121. See id. § 176 cmt. a.
122. See id. § 176 (1)(a) (1979).
123. See id.
124. See id. § 176 (2).
125. Id. § 176 cmt. f.
126. See id.
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is thereby induced to make the contract. If the court concludes
that the attempt to prevent B's employment elsewhere would
harm B and would not significantly benefit A, A's threat is im-
proper and the contract is voidable by B. 12 7
Regarding "power for illegitimate ends," the commentary itself is
vague as to how this rule operates. 128 Several illustrations, however, sug-
gest that the rule is a catchall provision that prohibits abuse of negotiating
power. One illustration notes that if a municipal water company threatens
to refuse to supply water to the developer's property unless the developer
assents to an unreasonable contract, then that company's threat amounts
to an illegitimate use of its power, thus making the threat improper and
the contract voidable. 129
Of course, the improper threat must also cause the assent. The Re-
statement's text focuses upon inducing assent, and the commentary ex-
plains this requirement.' 3 0 Comment C notes that the threat must have
substantially contributed to the victim's decision to manifest assent.131 It
notes that "[t] he test is subjective and the question is, did the threat actu-
ally induce assent on the part of the person claiming to be the victim of
duress."' 32 An evaluation of this requirement should consider all attend-
ant circumstances, including the relationship of the parties. 133
In addition to demonstrating that he or she has been exposed to an
improper threat, the victim must also demonstrate that he or she had no
reasonable alternative to assenting in order to take advantage of the eco-
nomic duress doctrine. The Restatement's commentary explains that a vic-
tim has a reasonable alternative to succumbing to the threat where an
alternative legal remedy exists that affords effective relief to the exigencies
of the victim's circumstances.13 4 To illustrate the standard, the Restatement
contrasts specific situations. A threat of commencing an ordinary civil ac-
tion to enforce a claim to money would not be duress because the victim
can assert his or her rights in the actions, which would be a reasonable
alternative to succumbing to the threat and entering into a contract, and
then asserting his or her rights in a subsequent action. 135 On the other
127. Id. § 176 cmt. f, illus. 12.
128. See id. § 176 cmt. f ("Clause (c) is concerned with cases in which the
threatened act involves the use of power for illegitimate ends. Many of the situa-
tions encompassed by [other clauses of this Section] involve extreme applications
of this general rule, but it is more broadly applicable to analogous cases.").
129. See id. § 176 cmt. f, illus. 16.
130. See id. § 175(b) (1979).
131. See id. § 175 cmt. c ("In order to constitute duress, the improper threat
must induce the making of the contract.").
132. Id.
133. See id. ("All attendant circumstances must be considered, including such
matters as age, background and relationship to parties.").
134. See id. § 175 cmt. b (explaining when no reasonable alternative exists).
135. See id. § 175 cmt. b, illus. 1.
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hand, if the victim is exposed to threats that involve the seizure of prop-
erty, the use of oppressive tactics, or the possibility of emotional conse-
quences, then there are no reasonable alternatives to assenting to the
threat. 136
Even if a contractual party has been subjected to an improper threat
to which the party had no reasonable alternative, the doctrine of eco-
nomic duress is inapposite where "the other party to the transaction in
good faith and without reason to know of the duress either gives value or
relies materially on the transaction."'137 The commentary explains that
"'[v]alue' includes a performance or a return promise that is
consideration." 1 3
8
B. Economic Duress Applied
The love contract policy is a classic example of economic duress. An
application of the law of economic duress to love contract policies in the
abstract substantiates this belief. After acknowledging that a contract ex-
ists, a victim can plead that his assent was the product of economic duress
and that the contract should therefore be voidable if the prerequisite ele-
ments are met.
First, there must have been a levy of an improper threat. The threat
of termination from employment, the non-fraternization policy aspect of
the love contract policy, is improper. 139 The Restatement notes that one
can identify an improper threat based upon either the substance of the
threat or the substance of the transaction. 140 The paradigmatic love con-
tract scenario involves an improper threat based upon both grounds.
A tenuous argument exists that the threat to terminate employees for
failing to sign a love contract alone may be so shocking as to be im-
proper.' 4 ' Such a finding, however, would run counter to a relatively con-
136. See id. § 175 cmt. b (discussing scenarios when no reasonable alternative
exists).
137. Id. § 175(2) (1979).
138. See id. § 175 cmt. e.
139. Tangentially, the threat has been communicated to the employees suffi-
ciently under the Restatement. This threat has been expressed to the employees in a
variety of ways, including corporate employee handbooks and e-mails reminders.
Surely if a threat can be implied from conduct, then an express written policy is
adequate. See id. § 175 cmt. a (stating threat can be implied from conduct).
140. Compare id. § 176 (1), with id. § 176 (2).
141. It is worth noting that the ultimate consequence for violation of a love
contract policy need not be termination of employment in order to implicate the
analysis of this paragraph and those that follow. Other procedures mandated by a
love contract can be problematic. For example, constructive discharge, a cause of
action closely related to wrongful discharge, refers to situations where the em-
ployee is not fired but quits under circumstances where the working conditions
have made continued employment intolerable. See Lindale v. Tokheim Corp., 145
F.3d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Trosper v. Bag 'N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704, 711
(Neb. 2007) ("An employee's right to be free from retaliatory demotion for filing a
workers' compensation claim is married to the right to be free from discharge.").
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stant principle in a significant body of case law and literature that non-
fraternization policies are legal because the underlying activity, sexual re-
lationships by and between coworkers, is not typically considered a pro-
tected activity and because employers possess good reasons to limit
workplace romance. 142 Despite this, based in part upon the circumstances
of the love contract policy's implementation and prior to its application by
the employer, it is possible that some jurisdictions may interpret termina-
tion for failing to sign a love contract as an actionable employment tort for
violation of the employer's well-recognized duty of good faith and fair
dealing. 14 3 Most particularly, such a termination could represent wrong-
Courts have noted that constructive discharge encompasses factual scenarios
where the changed conditions can include a demotion, reduction in salary, reduc-
tion in job responsibilities, and reassignment to menial or degrading work. See,
e.g., Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2001).
If the love contract itself specifies that the romance's end can affect any such con-
dition, then the substance of the contract may itself make the contract
unenforceable.
142. Cf Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 614-15 (11th Cir. 1995)
(analyzing statutory anti-nepotism policy that prohibited relatives of city employees
in supervisory positions from working in same department) (internal citations
omitted). The court noted:
Accordingly, the statute will not violate the Due Process Clause if it is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Warner Robins has
advanced several such interests: avoiding conflicts of interest between
work-related and family-related obligations; reducing favoritism or even
the appearance of favoritism; preventing family conflicts from affecting
the workplace; and, by limiting inter-office dating, decreasing the likeli-
hood of sexual harassment in the workplace. A rule that would prevent
supervisory employees from having to exercise their discretionary power
to hire, assign, promote, discipline or fire their relatives is rationally re-
lated to each of these practical, utilitarian goals. Therefore, we hold the
anti-nepotism policy adopted by Warner Robins is a reasonable attempt
to achieve legitimate government interests; as such, it is valid under the
Due Process Clause.
Id.; see also Gary M. Kramer, Limited License To Fish off the Company Pier: Toward
Express Employer Policies on Supervisor-Subordinate Fraternization, 22 W. NEw ENG. L.
REv. 77, 97 (2000) ("[A] narrowly-tailored employer policy, addressing only the
problem of supervisor-subordinate romances, will normally withstand judicial scru-
tiny under almost every common-law, statutory, and constitutional attack."); Doug-
las Messengill & Donald J. Peterson, Legal Challenges to No Fraternization Rules, 46
LAB. L.J. 429, 435 (1995) (" [E]mployers have essentially free rein to impose
prohibitions against fraternization between employees even when those employees
are away from the workplace."); Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 93, at 248 ("Legal
challenges to nonfraternization policies have been unsuccessful where employers
forewarned their employees about them and then applied them consistently.").
But see Guardsmark, LLC v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 369, 378-80 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding
nonfraternization rule that "sweeps ... broadly" to be unlawful in part because
National Labor Relations Act guarantees employees right to associate for purposes
of discussing terms and conditions of employment), rev'd, Guardsmark, LLC, 344
NLRB No. 97 (2004) (finding nonfraternization rule to be lawful because it would
not "reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity").
143. See Richard J. Kohlman, Wrongful Discharge-Bad Faith Dismissal of At-Will
Employee, 48 AM. JUJR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D §§ 1, 2 (2007) (explaining how bad faith
discharges of at-will employees can create actionable employment tort).
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ful discharge if a finder of law accepted that dismissal of the employee
would violate a fundamental principle of public policy.
Courts in certain circumstances have held that a threat to terminate
employment due to a workplace romance violated public policy and con-
stituted a viable claim of wrongful discharge. 144 For example, in Williams,
the Hearing Examiner determined that a clause in the love contract that
required the employee to leave the company following a workplace ro-
mance's termination was void for public policy reasons.145 The Examiner
so reasoned because such a clause would essentially condition employ-
ment upon the continuation of an affair, thereby constituting a waiver of
the employee's right to be free from adverse employment action due to
sex.
14 6
That analysis seems relevant here, where an employer requires ro-
mantic coworkers to sign a love contract or else be terminated. In some
circumstances, this threat alone can be rather shocking. For example, if in
the aftermath of a failed workplace romance, the employer strictly inter-
prets the love contract provision that requires former lovers to agree not
to allow the breakup to negatively impact the workplace environment and
holds both employees responsible for any negative impact, then the policy
would effectively cause employees to remain in workplace romances for
fear of being terminated in any aftermath. Some may interpret this conse-
quence like the Hearing Examiner did in Williams and conclude that the
threat of termination conditioned employment on the continuation of the
romance, thereby inhibiting the employees from being free from adverse
employment action due to sex. If, however, employees generally knew of
the love contract policy throughout their employment and employers uni-
formly applied it, this would decrease the probability that a court would
find the threat of termination alone violated either public policy or em-
ployment law.
An easier route to the conclusion that the love contract policy in-
volves an improper threat would be under Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 176 (2), which identifies threats as improper where there is a combina-
tion of unfair terms and the threat of termination. Here, the terms of the
144. See id. § 1 (listing examples of situations where threat to terminate em-
ployment creates actionable employment tort); cf. Richard K. Zuckerman &
Sharon H. Berlin, Romance in the Workplace: Employers Can Make Rules If They Serve
Legitimate Needs, 71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 43 (1999) (noting that there is no clear determina-
tion as to whether nonfraternization policies are legal in New York) (citing Pasch
v. Katz Media Corp., 94 Civ. 8554 (RPP), 1995 WL 469710, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8,
1995)) (refusing to dismiss plaintiff s claim that she had been demoted in violation
of state labor law for living with former co-employee because cohabitation and
social activities with workers is lawful recreational activity).
145. Though the Williams Hearing Examiner discussed the substance of the
love contract, see Hearing Examiner, Williams, supra note 104, at *17, which
brought the analysis beyond the scope of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176 (1)
because the substance of the agreement there relates so closely to the content of
the threat in the paradigmatic scenario, its analysis is persuasive here.
146. See Hearing Examiner, Williams, supra note 104, at *17.
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exchange are entirely unfair. The victims of the threat derive no real ben-
efit from the resulting love contract. The love contract does not bestow
upon its signatories any substantive rights. They receive no defined legal
rights and no additional financial compensation for signing the contract.
By contrast, the contract creates obligations that the signatories owe
to their employer. Indeed, several commentators have noted that the love
contract is a document that is intended to protect the employer from its
employees. The entirety of the circumstances, therefore, suggests that
though the terms of the love contract are of great benefit to the employer,
the love contract is unfair to the employee signatories.
These conditions likely satisfy Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176
(2) (a) because the employer does not appear to "significantly benefit" by
threatening to terminate employees who fail to sign love contracts.
Though the employer believes termination will protect it from sexual har-
assment suits, termination may create an alternative claim of wrongful dis-
charge. Likewise, the love contract does not even limit liability for sexual
harassment. Instead, it creates circumstantial, documentary evidence to
support the employer in certain, discrete sexual harassment actions.
Given the limited function of love contracts, one should conclude that the
threat of termination is improper because the love contract does not be-
stow significant benefits upon the employer.
The employer's threat of termination also uses "power for illegitimate
ends." By virtue of the nature of an employment relationship, the em-
ployer possesses a great degree of power over the employee. The em-
ployer's threat to use that power to sever the relationship is improper
because the creation of a love contract serves an illegitimate end.
Through the love contract policy, the employer exposes employees to
threats that involve their continued employment, which courts have inter-
preted to involve a property interest. 147 This inherently oppresses the em-
ployee. The threat of termination, therefore, serves illegitimate ends,
making the threat of employment termination improper.
Once a court determines that there was an improper threat, victims
must show that the threat actually induced their assent. As applied, this
means that the threat of termination must have substantially contributed
to the victim's decision to assent to the love contract.' 48 Undoubtedly the
threat of termination substantially, if not entirely, causes the victim to sign
a love contract. The victim derives no real benefit from signing the love
contract; instead, the victim owes new obligations to their employer. Also,
the substance of the exchange and the power difference by and between
the employer and the employees plays a significant role. It is therefore
147. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (discussing property
interest in public employment); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972)
(discussing property interest in public reemployment); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 492-93 (1959) (discussing limited property interest in specific private
employments).
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. c.
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unfathomable that a court could find that the threat of employment termi-
nation would not have induced the victim's assent.
The victim must also have had no reasonable alternative to assenting
to the threat. Here, the victim lacks a reasonable alternative. If employees
do not assent to the threat and refuse to sign the love contract, the em-
ployer will terminate them. The termination will come at great expense to
the victims; termination results in a loss of future income, decreased mar-
ketability for future employment, and even lower levels of mental
health. 149 No legal remedy affords effective relief to the exigencies of the
employee's circumstance. The employer's threat is not a threat to begin
an internal termination process in which the employees can assert their
rights; instead, the employer exposes employees to a threat that will result
in an immediate and direct loss. The only way in which employees could
assert their rights is by some subsequent action that the threat does not
contemplate. The victims therefore have no reasonable alternative to as-
senting to the love contract policy. 150
Additionally, the exception to the economic duress doctrine would
not apply. The doctrine does not apply where the other party to the trans-
action possesses reason to know of the duress.15 1 Both parties to a love
contact clearly have reason to know of the duress-the threat of termina-
tion of employment if the love contract is not signed is known by both
parties to the contract, as the policy appears in the corporate employee
handbook and is widely disseminated. Because both parties to a love con-
tract know of the duress to which the other is subjected, here the excep-
tion is inapplicable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the restrictive legal and social perspectives about the propri-
ety of workplace romances, employers do not have an unrestricted right to
attempt to prohibit such romances. The love contract policy is one at-
tempt that is misguided. A contractual law analysis raises serious questions
about the enforceability of love contract policies. Because love contracts
are signed under economic duress, they become wholly voidable; courts
can release love contract-bound employees from any additional obliga-
tions that they owe their employer, and any attempt to use the terms of the
love contract in any employment litigation would be legally impossible.
Employers who seek to restrict workplace romance should therefore con-
sider alternative human resource policies. Perhaps employers will even
149. See Margaret W. Linn, Richard Sandifer & Shayna Stein, Effects of Unem-
ployment on Mental and Physical Health, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 502 (1985).
150. But see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. c ("Since alter-
native sources of funds are ordinarily available, a refusal to pay money is not du-
ress, absent a showing of peculiar necessity.").
151. See id. § 175(2).
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come to accept that Cupid can strike at any moment and will simply em-
brace his work; unfortunately, such an attitudinal change is likely nothing
more than the idyllic wish of a romantic sap.
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